












Title: Of wild(e)ness and carceral subjectivity 
 
Author: Leszek Drong 
 
Citation style: Drong Leszek. (1997). Of wild(e)ness and carceral 
subjectivity. W: T. Rachwał, W. Kalaga (red.), "The wild and the tame : 




Of Wild(e)ness and Carcerai Subjectivity
The final stage o f Oscar W ilde’s life was marked by an accumulation of 
unexpected events which culminated in a most startling denouement. His attach­
ment to Lord Alfred Douglas gave rise to a conflict between Wilde as a supposed 
corruptor of the youth and the Marquis of Queensbury, Douglas’s father. In an 
attempt to provoke litigation, Queensbury accused Wilde o f sodomy and the 
depravation of his son. The writer could not but stand his ground. He sued 
Queensbury for libel and lost the case. Subsequently, Wilde was charged with acts 
of gross indecency which had been brought up in the course o f the Queensbury 
trial. And again the court found him to have been on the wrong side o f the law. 
He was sentenced to two years o f imprisonment with hard labour.
Oscar Wilde commenced his term with a very vague realisation of the transgres­
sion he had committed. His conduct prior to his confinement can be described as 
that of a pliant stalking-horse. Manipulated by his lover, he was trapped into bring­
ing about his own destruction. In the course of a complex lawsuit his legal status 
underwent a radical change; initially the plaintiff, Wilde soon turned into the de­
fendant. The alteration of the roles which were imposed upon him rather than 
accepted willingly shows that at that stage things got entirely out of his control. Wilde 
acknowledges later that his “will power became absolutely subject to [Douglas’s]”.1 
The present essay attempts to analyse the implications of that subjection and the extent 
to which one can be confined to one’s own subjectivity. It tries to open the gates 
leading to the discursive field which has its locus in the jail yard or, more specifi­
cally, in a carceral cell which is a subjective zone par excellence.
1 Oscar Wilde, De Profundis and Other Writings (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 
1987), p. 103
Through most of his sentence Wilde suffered all the rigours o f the peniten­
tiary discipline. He was allowed to read but his books were censored; he was 
allowed to write letters but they were meticulously scrutinised by the-prison 
authorities. At the end o f his term, however, and mainly thanks to the leniency 
of the new governor o f the Reading Gaol, he contrived to write a longer prose 
narrative in the guise of an epistolary text. Ostensibly, the letter was addressed 
to Lord Alfred Douglas but Wilde by no means intended it to be a mere piece 
o f correspondence. He asked his friend Robert Ross to copy it before sending to 
Douglas and preserve the text which became “the only document that gives any 
explanation of my [Wilde’s] extraordinary behaviour .. ,”2 That Wilde attached con­
siderable significance to the shape of his self-revealing testimony can be inferred 
from numerous revisions and corrections that he introduced. Although Vyvyan 
Holland in the introduction to De Profundis emphasises that the strict prison rules 
allowed the prisoner only one sheet o f paper at a time and thus Wilde could never 
revise the finished document,3 Richard Ellmann points out that Major Nelson, who 
was the Governor of the Reading Gaol, relaxed the rules and allowed Wilde to 
keep the whole text in his cell and revise it or rewrite it when necessary.4 Ulti­
mately, as it stands, De Profundis defies Wilde’s own assertion that “there is in 
it nothing o f rhetoric”.5 It is precisely an instance of what Paul de Man calls 
“performative rhetoric”6 by means of which the autobiographer -  and De Pi ofundis 
is to a large extent an autobiography -  aims at affecting extratextual reality.
In order to discuss Wilde’s text it is necessary to negotiate the various modes 
o f subjectivity that both the writer and the character designated by that name may 
assume. Moreover, to avoid getting embroiled in the extratextual aspects of De 
Profundis, one should bear in mind that the Wilde o f numerous biographical 
accounts is yet another literary character whose life and opinions, as we know them, 
are anything but factual.
In W ilde’s case, the autobiographical impulse, that urge which Jean Jacques 
Rousseau describes as a compulsion to leave behind “a witness in my favour that 
will sooner or later triumph over the machinations of men”,7 seems to have origi­
nated in the Reading Gaol. The carceral circumstances, the precipitous course of 
his career culminating in his downfall and ultimate ignominy, must have prompted 
him to meditate upon that image which one leaves behind in the memory of men. 
His prison record indicates that soon after he had managed to come to terms with
2 Quoted in the introduction to Oscar Wilde, De Profundis, p. 92.
3 Vyvyan Holland, “Introduction” to Oscar Wilde, De Profundis, p. 91.
4 Richard Ellmann, Oscar Wilde (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1988), p. 479.
5 Oscar Wilde, De Profundis, p. 198.
6 Paul de Man, Allegories o f  Reading: Figurai Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke and 
Proust (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 282.
7 Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Confessions (London: Penguin Books, 1953), p. 525.
his life behind bars, Wilde asked for several books which included St.Augustine’s 
Confessions, Pascal’s Pensees and Newman’s Apologia Pro Vita S u a s That the 
reading o f those pious texts exerted some influence upon the shape o f De Profundis 
can be inferred not only from the title of W ilde’s autobiography. Alongside his 
fascination with Catholicism, it contributed to the overall tone of the letter which 
is that o f a humble confession; “A man’s very highest moment is, I have no doubt 
at all, when he kneels in the dust, and beats his breast, and tells all the sins of 
his life.”9 Wilde consciously models him self on a penitent confessing subject 
feigning obeisance to the verdict of the Law which he accepts as the verdict of 
God. He embarks on a task unique in his career, namely, that o f disclosing the 
truth about his life. But he cannot fail to introduce some melodramatic overtones 
into his account; in the conflict between Art and veracity it is always the former 
that gets the upper hand. Inasmuch as he takes pains to convey a very detailed 
and touching picture o f his humility and degradation, he endows his carceral 
predicament with vivid aesthetic qualities and his confession becomes a pose 
assumed for want of better ones rather than a spiritual watershed.
The tendency to view himself as an aesthetic subject dates back to Wilde’s 
Trinity years. In order to instil artistic undertones into his career he used to sign 
his contributions to the academic magazine with the complete set of his initials 
“O.F.O.F.W.W”. (Oscar Fingal O ’Flahertie Wills W ilde).10 What he found attrac­
tive about that nom de plume was, no doubt, a certain regular pattern of reitera­
tion. Later on, he travelled under an assumed name o f Lord Robinson,11 the 
pseudonym selected by no means at random. Finally, when he was transferred to 
the Reading Gaol, he enthusiastically embraced his new cognomen “C.3.3” which 
also promised some symbolic significance.
The course o f events that led to his confinement was ineluctable and left Wilde 
powerless to defend himself. In court, listening to the indictments aimed at his 
conduct he suddenly realised that the image and import of one’s life story were 
essentially involved in the exercise of power and authority. “How splendid it would 
be if  I was saying all this about m yself’,12 that is how in De Profundis he summed 
up his reaction to the accounts o f his trangression given by the hostile prosecu­
tors. In this desire to be the sole author of his curriculum vitae there surfaces the 
impulse common to all autobiographers. What Wilde desires is to regain control 
not so much over his own life, which is in the hands of the jury, as over the narrative 
portraying his tempestuous career. He strives to master his own representation,
8 Cf. Richard Ellmann, Oscar Wilde, p. 456.
9 Oscar Wilde, De Profundis, p. 197.
10 Cf. Richard Ellmann, Oscar Wilde, p. 16.
11 The idea o f  “donning” a false name for the duration o f  a journey or a period o f  transition is 
also explored in Jean Jacques Rousseau’s Confessions. Cf., e.g., p. 145.
12 Oscar Wilde, De Profundis, p. 197.
and reclaim the copyright -  le droit d'auteur -  for his biography. His text proves 
that it is not enough to steer the course o f one’s life; one has to hold sway over 
the elusive flickers o f descriptions and epithets, metaphors and similies, in short, 
over the discourse which constitutes the only permanent human subject.13
Paradoxically enough, Wilde comes to appreciate the power of the discourse of 
the self in the house of detention. It is his experience of the penitentiary mecha­
nisms that allows him to grasp their actual importance. Accordingly, he applies writing 
as a means o f resisting those mechanisms. His resistance is aimed primarily at 
isolation which is, as Michel Foucault observes, a basic principle of confinement.14 
Isolation forms a convenient hold for the application of power leading to the trans­
formation o f the convict; “through the reflection that it gives rise to and the remorse 
that cannot fail to follow, solitude must be a positive instrument o f reform”.17 What 
the process manifests is also the asymmetrical distribution of power rendering the 
prisoner’s identity dependent on the carceral discipline. Thus, by moulding his own 
model in ink, Wilde fends off the possibility of becoming a penitentiary object shaped 
according to the demands of the Law.
Michel Foucault, in reading the intricate alterations o f disciplinary mechanisms 
in the eighteenth century emphasises the association of power with knowledge.16 
In point of fact, a parallel theme of Nosce teipsum dates back to the ancient Greece. 
That in order to exercise self-control and authority over oneself one requires self- 
knowledge becomes evident from Socrates onwards. Foucault describes that 
phenomenon in The History o f  Sexuality as the relation to truth constituting the 
ontological foundations of subjectivity.17 The imperative “know thyself’ becomes 
a prerequisite for the formation o f selfhood whose shape and foundations rest on 
that self-centred cognition. In other words, self-examination is not restricted to its 
epistemological function but one is, first and foremost, defined by one’s relation 
to oneself;
It’s then a matter o f form ing  and recognizing oneself as the subject o f one’s own actions, 
not through a system of signs denoting power over others, but through a relation that depends 
as little as possible on status and its external forms, for this relation is fulfilled in the 
sovereignty that one exercises over oneself.18
13 Cf. Emile Benveniste, “Subjectivity in Language”, in Problems in General Linguistics (Coral 
Gables, Florida: University o f Miami Press, 1984), pp. 223-30.
14 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish -. The Birth o f  the Prison  (London: Penguin Books, 
1979), p. 236.
15 Ibid., p. 237.
16 Ibid., p. 224.
17 Cf. Michel Foucault, The Use o f  Pleasure, Vol. 2 o f The History o f  Sexuality (London: Pen­
guin Books, 1992), p. 89.
18 Michel Foucault, The Care o f  the S e lf  Vol. 3 o f The History o f  Sexuality (London: Penguin 
Books, 1990), p. 85 [emphasis mine].
In this structure o f the application o f power one seems to be its subject and 
its object at the same time. But the necessary detour through self-knowledge 
that one must make on the way to oneself implies the exercise o f discourse, 
that is, it essentially involves “the detour through the Other”, to use Derrida’s 
phrase.19
The Other may manifest his/her/its existence on the printed page of an auto­
biography as well as on the polished surface of a speculum. When Narcissus falls 
for his reflection in the water his desire is as selfless as it is irresistible. Accord­
ing to Mikkel Borch-Jakobsen, what Narcissus actually desires is to become 
a subject and identify himself with the illusory mirror-image which constitutes his 
representation.20 Similarly, Wilde expects that Art, as the supreme speculum , will 
allow him to see his true features and disclose himself to others. Art is to him 
“the great primal note by which I . .. revealed, first myself to myself, and then 
myself to the world; the great passion of my life”.21 What is at stake here is not 
only the epistemological impulse to know oneself but also the emotional involve­
ment in the enterprise which results from the ontological condition of privation. 
Wilde, like Narcissus, desires to be a subject because he lacks subjecthood; “if 
I desire to be (an) I, if  I desire myself, it must, following elementary logic, be 
because I am not it”.22 Narcissus is an allegorical paradigm of the autobiographer 
who plunges into discourse in quest of an “I”; Art perversely promises the boon 
of subjecthood but offers him his Other.
What makes Art’s lure so appealing is precisely the phantasmal refuge from  
the Other that it seems to provide. In W ilde’s autobiographical letter, literature 
forms a counterbalance to the obtrusive company of Lord Douglas who is “the 
absolute ruin o f [Wilde’s] art”.23 W ilde’s creativity is paralysed in the presence 
o f his lover whose friendship is “intellectually degrading”24 to the artist. Douglas 
represents the worldly element in their relationship and belongs to the order of 
Society. His role is that of a distraction and a diversion. Art, by way of contrast, 
functions for Wilde as a solitary retreat; a locus of voluntary confinement. Strik­
ingly enough, when Wilde gets physically -  and no doubt involuntarily -  behind 
bars, he is inclined to find his carceral isolation less propitious for artistic mani­
festations. Confronted with himself, sentenced to his own company, he is finally 
offered an opportunity to define his own subjectivity, starting from scratch
19 Jacques Derrida, The Ear o f  the Other: Otobiography, Transference, Translation (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1985), p. 88.
2,1 Mikkel Borch-Jakobsen, “The Freudian Subject, from Politics to Ethics”, in Who Comes After 
the Subjects eds. E. Cadava, P. Connor and J. L. Nancy (New York and London: Routledge, 1991), 
p. 69.
21 Oscar Wilde, De Profundis, p. 129.
22 Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, “The Freudian Subject, from Politics to Ethics”, p. 66.
23 Oscar Wilde, De Profundis, p. 101.
24 Ibid., p. 100.
“a Vita Nuova”,25 as he poetically describes his new life. But face to face with 
his ‘pure’ self, Wilde regresses to his memories instead of renouncing them in 
an effort to purge himself o f the Other. He feels obliged to assert his personal 
history by claiming that “to regret one’s experiences is to arrest one’s own de­
velopment”.26 Hence, his new life is “no new life at all, but simply the continu­
ance, by means of development and evolution, of [his] former life”.27 Even in prison 
he cannot fail to absorb what Derrida calls “the trace of the Other in us, the Other’s 
irreducible presence”.28 His carceral attempt to become oneself where one can be 
nobody else proves to be a failure.
One cannot escape sharing the cell with the Other. According to Martin 
H eidegger’s existential analytic in Sein und Zeit, coexistence with others, 
Being-with, as he formulates it, “is an existential characteristic o f Dasein even 
when factically no Other is present-at-hand or perceived” .29 D asein’s subjec­
tivity cannot be reduced to the singular; it is rather a variant name of a re­
lation which is established between the self and the Other, namely, the rela­
tion o f subjection;
Dasein, as everyday Being-with-one-another, stands in subjection [Bottmassigkeit] to Others.
It itself is not; its Being has been taken away by the Others. D asein’s  everyday possibilities
o f Being are for the Others to dispose o f as they please.30
To answer the question about the “who” of these Others Heidegger introduces the 
term das Man (the impersonal “they”) which is a primordial phenomenon belong­
ing to D asein’s positive constitution. Das Man exercises its authority over Dasein 
by means o f prescribing opinions and judgements, tastes and impressions, but 
shrinks from being identified with a particular Other. It is exterior to the self and 
yet it is constantly being reabsorbed into the unprotected interiority o f D asein’s 
identity. Dasein is thus deprived of the very possibility of being one-self. Or rather, 
Dasein is always itself but it never exists homogeneously. It is a composite o f the 
elements which, unchecked, penetrate the cellular walls o f the self. Das Man must 
be crumbled and dispersed to effect this osmosis; hence its vagueness and insidi­
ousness.
25 Ibid., p. 152.
“ Ibid., p. 156.
27 Ibid., p. 163.
28 Jacques Derrida, Memoires fo r  Paul de Man (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 
p. 29.
29 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1962), p. 156; 
In Heidegger’s analytic, Dasein is obviously not tantamount to the notion o f the subject but it comes 
to occupy the same place and retains its essential traits. Cf. Jacques Derrida, “Eating Well, or 
the Calculation o f  the Subject: An Interview with Jacques Derrida”, in E. Cadava, P. Connor and 
J. L. Nancy, eds., Who Comes A fter the Subject?, p. 98.
30 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 164.
Heidegger’s spectacular declaration: “Everyone is the other, and no one is 
himself”,31 apart from anything else, points to the interchangeability o f the respec­
tive positions of Dasein and the Other, which makes das M an’s “dictatorship” even 
more effective. The very word “dictatorship” brings to mind a political context 
o f Dasein’s predicament. Das Man, as a phenomenon characteristic of Being-with- 
one-another, is responsible for constituting what Heidegger calls “publicness”.32 
Its function is parallel to that of the Law; it “proximally controls every way in 
which the world and Dasein get interpreted, ... it is insensitive to every differ­
ence o f level and genuineness”.33 Thus das Man relies on “averageness”; it op­
erates in the name of a unified and generally accepted standard and suppresses 
any manifestations of individuality which, by defining an individual in opposition 
to that standard, introduces the element of transgression. Das Man is invested with 
the capacity of a police agent whose task is to discipline the deliquent and reclaim 
him for the community. It functions as the principle o f the unwritten law keeping 
watch over any symptom of transgression. Needless to say, once a transgression 
is committed, the transgressor is bound to be incarcerated.
The ideology o f the prison has been inseparably associated with its reforma­
tory function. The transformation of the individual by means of labour and co­
ercion is justified by its ‘therapeutic’ objective. The jargon o f the founding fa­
thers o f the prison is borrowed from the medical lexicon, including such words 
and phrases as “a therapy”, “to cure” or “to diagnose”.34 The application of the 
same type o f discourse runs parallel with the deployment of similar disciplinary 
mechanisms in relation to prisoners and patients, especially those suffering from 
contagious diseases. Bentham’s Panopticon, as a prototype o f the modern house 
o f correction, allows, in Foucault’s view, for a multiplicity of functions, which 
makes it “a figure of political technology that may and must be detached from 
any specific use”.35 By employing power over pathology -  be it medical or social 
-  the Law aims at the recuperation of the individual. The isolation he must suffer 
is prescribed as a remedy. But in the carceral cell, it is ultimately the prisoner 
himself who is left in charge of the treatment.
The avowed aim of the penal system, however, may be challenged by the 
progress o f a malady which develops within the self and comes to verge on 
madness. For Wilde, confinement and isolation epitomise the pathological state 
o f separation from the Other. His imprisonment is prefigured in his Brighton 
experience when he falls ill and is confined to bed for a couple of days. Doug­
las, who stays with him in the same hotel, shuns his company, which makes Wilde
51 Ibid., p. 165.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Cf. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish , p. 227 and passim.
35 Ibid., p. 205.
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feel “unattended” and deprived of “mere necessaries”.36 Douglas’s absence is 
for him a symptom o f the painful and drastic rift between himself and the Other, 
and so is his subsequent solitude behind bars. In prison, when he is confronted 
with his sterile self, forcefully severed from his Other, Wilde is consumed by 
“sexual madness”, as he acknowledges in his plea for release.37 It is not by 
accident, then, that madness is supposed to pertain to m an’s perception of 
himself, to his “delusive attachment to h im self’,38 rather than to his relation to 
the external world.
The erotic undertones of this malady are strikingly inconspicuous in Wilde’s 
letter. He never mentions, nor even alludes to, the sexual context o f his relation­
ship with Douglas. As if to defy the precepts of the confessional discourse which 
compel him to unburden himself of his most grievous transgressions in order to 
achieve absolution and begin a new life (and this is what Wilde claims for him­
self in De Profundis), he produces a balance sheet o f his expenditure on Douglas. 
His lover becomes an object of a financial settlement rather than an addressee of 
amorous discourse. Wilde disguises his desire for the Other behind the economic 
jargon taking advantage o f “a very pronounced ambiguity between the sexual 
meaning and the economic meaning of certain terms”39 which exists in Greek as 
well as in many other languages. Thus the word soma may designate both the body 
and possessions; ousia means fortune but also sperm and the loss of the latter might 
signify the expenditure of the former.40
Wilde’s relationship with Lord Alfred Douglas is blatantly irregular not just 
because at the end of the nineteenth century homosexuality connotes a subversive 
and disruptive social pattern. Their affair engages them in a structure of exploi­
tation and financial abuse in which Douglas confines his involvement to the 
demands and reception of benefits whereas Wilde is obliged to supply the required 
commodities.41 The status quo cannot satisfy Wilde who delivers a list of mon­
etary grievances trying to limit his excessive outflow. The frivolous extravagance 
entails the investment in the Other of his physical and emotional assets. In ad­
dition, it presupposes a degree of intimacy making this exchange possible. What 
W ilde’s liason with Douglas cannot veil is his tendency to obscure the boundaries 
of his self. It is additionally emphasised by the asymmetrical quality o f their part­
nership. Wilde complains that his “substance” is taken over by his lover; “Having 
made your most of my genius, my will power, my fortune, you required, in the
36 Oscar Wilde, De Profundis, p. 116.
37 Richard Ellmann, Oscar Wilde, p. 471.
38 Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History o f  Insanity in the Age o f  Reason (Lon­
don: Routledge, 1971), p. 27.
39 Michel Foucault, The Care o f  the S e lf  p. 27.
40 Cf. ibid., p. 27.
41 Cf. Oscar Wilde, De Profundis, pp. 102, 123—4.
blindness of an inexhaustible greed, my entire existence”.'12 Thus Wilde is ren­
dered void by the Other. By becoming subjected to Douglas he is made subjectless, 
that is, deprived of his own subjecthood.
The continual fluctuation of subject-object positions demonstrates the ontologi­
cal potential at Wilde’s disposal. At the same time, his status is connected with the 
ethical stance that he tends to assume in relation to Lord Alfred Douglas. The latent 
possibilities of misinterpretation and abuse of his discourse are also due to the 
ambiguity of his letter. In point of fact, the “straighter” it is the more subversive 
potential it accumulates. De Profundis, as a text, allows for both literal friendship 
and allegorical homosexual relationship and thus reverses the actual circumstances 
of Wilde and Douglas’s affair. By intimating sexual undertones of his text Wilde 
stimulates “a liberation of symbolic energy”, to borrow Barthes’s expression.4’ It is 
let loose and allowed to proliferate at large, even at the risk of running wild.
Paradoxically enough, to tame what Wilde allegorically describes in his letter, 
the Law has to rely on a discourse which is hardly less equivocal. The sentence 
that Mr Justice Wills meted out to Wilde was based on The Criminal Law 
Amendment Act of 1885 which was supposed to designate, in legal terms, the 
nature of his offence. It reads as follows:
Any male person who, in public or private, commits, or is a party to the commission by 
any male person of, any act o f gross indecency with another male person, shall be guilty 
o f misdemaneur, and, being convicted thereof, shall be liable, at the discretion o f the Court, 
to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years with or without hard labour.'14
Apparently, the judge had no doubts about the necessity of passing the severest 
possible verdict43 though the formulation “any act of gross indecency” leaves much 
scope for interpretation. It must function in a specific cultural and ethical context, 
otherwise it becomes vague and, instead of stigmatising a transgression, it raises 
questions about the varying social attitudes towards morality. In a sense, Wilde’s 
transgressivc potential is opposed by the exercise of legal power resorting to 
a very similar discursive quality.
There is much more to Wilde’s legal and social position than just his ethical 
transgression. His sexuality is interwoven with other aspects of his existence. Just 
like at the end of the nineteenth century aestheticism became synonymous with 
homosexuality, the former being a euphemism for the latter,46 the term “homo­
sexual” was supposed to define an individual to the extent that, according to 
Jonathan Dollimore, “by the time of Wilde, homosexuality could be regarded as
42 Ibid., p. 104.
41 Roland Barthes, Image-Music-Text (London: Fontana, 1977), p. 158.
44 Quoted in Richard Ellmann, Oscar Wilde, p. 386.
45 Cf. ibid., pp. 448-9.
46 Cf. ibid., p. 80.
rooted in a person’s identity and as pathologically pervading all aspects of his 
being”.47 Therefore from numerous facets of W ilde’s biography, his sexual ori­
entation comes to the fore and becomes constitutive of his subjecthood, at least 
in the view of his prosecutors. Society concentrates its legal, canonical and even 
medical resources to identify the perpetrator of sodomy with his transgression;
The nineteenth-century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history, and 
a childhood, in addition to being a type o f life, a life form, and a morphology, with an 
indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology. Nothing that went into his total 
composition was unaffected by his sexuality. It was everywhere present in him: at the root 
o f all his actions because it was their insidious and indefinitely active principle; written im­
modestly on his face and body because it was a secret that always gave itself away. It was 
consubstantial with him, less as a habitual sin than as a singular nature.48
W ilde’s homosexuality appears, thus, to be hardly “a temporary aberration”; it is 
rather a symptom of what Michel Foucault describes as “a hermaphrodism of the 
soul”.49 For his judges, Wilde ceases to be an artist, a personality or a member 
of society. For them, he is exclusively a homosexual.
It is not surprising, then, that sexuality is the only formative element of his 
identity ostensibly, or even ostentatiously, left out of W ilde’s epistolary autobi­
ography. In fact, his attachment to his lover probably does not consist in merely 
sexual attraction. But Wilde’s letter must counterbalance the prejudice o f the public, 
hence the necessity to disguise the virtual character of their friendship. However, 
though Wilde pretends to settle his affairs with his lover, he actually indulges in 
the allegorical overview of his affection for Douglas, just as De Profundis pur­
ports to lay the foundations of W ilde’s new subjectivity but in the guise of the 
discourse of the self it manifests a longing for the Other. That Wilde invests too 
much in Douglas gives indications o f the excessive nature of their relationship 
culminating in W ilde’s confinement. Evidently, one should not yield entirely to 
the Other.
47 Jonathan Dollimore, Sexual Dissidence: Augustine to Wilde, Freud to Foucault (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 67.
48 Michel Foucault, An Introduction, Vol. I o f The History o f  Sexuality (Harmondsworth: Pen­
guin Books, 1990), p. 43.
49 Ibid.
